In Shapley (1964) several conditions are given for the existence of pure saddlepoints for a matrix game. In this paper we show that only a few of these conditions, when translated to the situation of a bimatrix game guarantee the existence of pure equilibria. Further, we associate with a bimatrix game a directed graph as well as a so-called 'binary game'. If this graph has no cycles, then the bimatrix game in question has a pure equilibrium. It is shown that the binary game for a bimatrix game without a pure equilibrium possesses a 'fundamental' subgame, which can be characterized by means of 'minimal' cycles.
I Introduction
In Shapley (1964) various (sufficient) conditions are given for the existence of pure saddlepoints for matrix games. Each of these conditions requires that every submatrix of some fixed size has a pure saddlepoint. These conditions can easily be extended to bimatrix games, but what can be said about the existence of pure equilibria? In section 3 we give an example of a bimatrix game which satisfies all the various conditions of Shapley, translated to the situation for bimatrix games. This game however, does not have a pure equilibrium. Since this example concerns a square game, it does not fully account for the general situation. Indeed, in section 4, we show that some of Shapley's conditions are still useful to obtain pure equilibrium results for non-square bimatrix games. Furthermore we introduce for a bimatrix game the binary game. This is a bimatrix game which assigns for a player a payoff 1 to a pair of pure strategies if (in the original game) the strategy of this player is a pure best reply to the strategy of his opponent. To other pairs of pure strategies a payoff 0 is assigned. Next a directed graph is associated with the binary game. We give another condition for the existence of a pure equilibrium for a bimatrix game in terms of cycles in this graph. Note that also Smadici (1979) used graph theoretical methods to generalize a result of Shapley (1964) concerning generalized saddlepoints of matrix games to the case of a bimatrix game. In section 5 we study games without a pure equilibrium. For such games the binary game possesses a specific subgame, which is called a fundamental subgame. These fundamental subgames are characterized by means of 'minimal' cycles and their form is described in section 6. 
Some Results of Shapley on Saddlepoints
In Shapley (1964) the following results concerning the existence of saddlepoints for matrix games are presented. Here we give an example which shows that the statements in the theorems above cannot be extended to bimatrix games and equilibria. We consider the
